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I  am  most  grateful  to you  Mr.  Chairman  and  to  the 
Virginia Cooperative  Extension  Service  for giving me  this 
opportunity of saying  a  few  words  to you  on  such  an  impor-
tant topic  - one with implications  not only for  European 
farmers  but also  for  American agriculture.  And  one  with 
particular relevance  today  when  both the  EC  and  US  are  re-
viewing their farm policies. 
I  propose  spending  the half hour  alloted to  me  this 
morning  saying something  about  the  Common  Agricultural Policy 
where it has  got to  and  the  course plotted for its future. 
I 
/  As  most  of you will  know~  the  European  Community  has 
i 
operated its own  farm policy  - the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
or  CAP  - for  the last 20  years or so,  and  I  imagine  that you 
will also appreciate its great importance not only to our  8 
million  farmers  and  their families  but also to all  270  mio 
Europeans  living in our  10  Member  States. 
The  objectives of the  CAP  - set out in the  Treaty of 
Rome,  our  founding  Constitution  - can  be  summarised  as  follows: 
L 
- to  increase productivity through  technical progress; 
- to  give  the  farmer  a  fair standard of living 
- to assure  the  supply of sufficient food  at 
reasonable prices,  and 
- to stabilise markets. 
. I ... .___ 
Goals  which  are not very different  - I  would  have  thought 
from  US  Farm Policy,  but  - I  get the  impression  - that 
there is perhaps  less emphasis  here  on  stability of prices 
and  security of supply.  And,  what is more,  we  both have 
policies which  have  had  uncomfortably similar results. 
Very broadly,  the objectives of the Treaty have  been 
achieved by  fixing  common  prices  for  the major part of our 
but by no means all 
farm production.  Some;of  these  prices  are at higher levels 
than  those  in  the  US.  But  assurance of  supply like any  in-
surance  policy costs  money.  And  the European  consumer  is 
2. 
prepared  to  pay  this small  premium.  But here,  let me  empha-
sise that the  CAP  should not be  looked at in  a  purely 
economic  context but against  a  social,  political,  cultural 
and  environmental  background  as  well.  We  believe  that  the 
well-being of agriculture is essential to  the  fabric of 
rural life. 
Let  us  now  look briefly at what  the effects of 
achieving these objectives  have  been  - both inside  and 
outside  the  Community. 
We  are  frequently  accused  by  our critics of  spending 
limitless  sums  of money  to  encourage  our  farmers  to  produce 
enormous  surpluses  which  are  then  off-loaded onto world 
markets  with  unfair subsidies.  But let us  examine  the  facts • 
. I ... 3. 
First.  As  a  result of the  support  we  give  our  farmers, 
our wheat production,  for  example,  has  increased by  29%  over 
the last decade  - slightly more  than  the world  average  of 27%. 
The  increase here  in the  US  has  been  73%  and  a  lot of that 
in soft wheat  grown  largely in  the Eastern half of the  u.s. 
and  frequently double-cropped with soya.  This  increase is 
2  1/2  times  the world  average.  I  say  this in no  accusatory 
sense,  but in  an  attempt  to set the  record straight.  Further-
more,  the  increase in Community  production  has  been  achieved 
through higher yields  on  an  acreage  that has  remained  virtual-
ly unchanged  for  the last ten  to fifteen years. 
Second  - the  extent of our expenditure. 
Our  total  farm  spending  on  all agricultural  products  at an 
all  time  record of 13.5  bio  $  in 1983,  compared with  almost 
30  bio  $  here  - PIK  included  - represented less  than  1/2  of 
one  per cent of the  Community's  GDP. 
And,  unlike all national  governments  that  I  know  of, 
there is  a  rigid limit as  to  the  amount  we  can  spend 
since  our Constitution forbids  us  from  running  a  deficit. 
As  to  the  impact of  the  CAP  and  our  much  criticised 
export refunds  on  world markets,  just three points. 
Since  I  get the distinct impression  that there  is  a  feeling 
amongst  less well  informed  groups  than this one  that agri-
cultural subsidies are  an  invention of  cunning Europeans  and 
the work  of the devil. 
./  ... First,  international trading rules  formalised  in the 
GATT  to which  both  the  US  and  the  EC  and  90  or so other 
nations  are  signatories,  specifically permit  the  use  of 
export refunds  or subsidies,  provided  they are  not  used 
to  gain  more  than  an  equitable share of the market.  We 
maintain,  and  trade statistics support our view,  that we 
L  have  kept to  these rules. 
For  example,  over  the  ten years  up  to  the beginning 
of  the  80's,  the  Community  share of  the world market  in 
wheat  and wheat/flour rose  from  10%  to  14%  ;  that of the 
US  from  34%  to  46%.  I  submit  that on  the basis of these 
figures  no  reasonable  person  could possibly conclude  that 
we  had  acted against  the  rules or  taken  an  inequitable 
share. 
Second,  the  US,  in addition  to  supporting its agri-
culture at home  pretty generously over  recent years,  also 
deploy~a panoply of export aids  - GSM-102,  PL-480,  Blended 
I 
Credits  and  plain unvarnished  subsidies. 
On  the  question of credit for  farm exports,  Secretary 
Block said recently with  some  pride that:  "This Administra-
tion spent more  on  credit  for  agricultural exports  in the 
last  3  years  than all previous  administrations  together 
over  the  last 25".  And  on  US  farm  export subsidies. 
.. I ... 
4. Obliged  in my  present post to at least cast an  eye  over the 
never ending  stream of  USDA  publications,  I  noticed in  an 
April  issue entitled "Middle East  & North Africa  - Outlook 
& Situation"  the  following  sentence  :  "In 1983,  Egypt  bought 
1  mio  of  US  wheat  flour at a  subsidised price of only  $136 
per  ton,  about one-third below  the  average world market  price" 
and  an  accompanying  graph  shows  with startling clarity how 
the  United States'  share of the Egyptian market  has  evolved 
spectacularly  from  1972  when it had  no  share at all to  1983 
when  it had  40%  of  the  total  market  - domestic  production 
included  about  50%  of the  imports. 
But,  before  I  leave  the  question of  the  macho  Egyptian 
flour deal,  allow  me  to disabuse  you of the  notion  frequently 
put about  that it brought  the  EC  scuttling to  the  negotiating 
table.  The  US  and  EC  had  in  fact  already started  a  series of 
meetings  before  this unfortunate  initiative and  what  this 
deal  did was  to very nearly  torpedo  them.  They  did continue 
nevertheless  but  I  can  assure  you  - since  I  was  present -
in  a  much  chillier atmosphere.  So,  agricultural subsidies 
are  a  fact of life and  perhaps  we  are all sinners  in  the 
eyes  of  the  Lord. 
But this brief look at some  of the  similarities and 
differences  between  us  should not be  taken  to  imply  that 
everything is  fine  on  the  other side of  the Atlantic  and 
that we  have  no  problems  whatsoever  in  the  Community • 




Those  of you  \vho  follow  developments  in  the  Community, 
if only  through your  newspapers,  will be  well  aware  of the 
serious  challenges  we  currently face.  On  the  agriculture 
front,  we  are both of us  - US  and  EC  together  - basically 
presented with  the  same  problem  :  that of producing  larger 
quantities  than markets  can  absorb which,  of course,  is not 
the  same  as  saying that there is too  much  food  in the world. 
Whilst  I  strongly believe that the  CAP  is one  of the 
major  achievements  of the  European  Community,  it must  -
like  any  other institution or policy,  if it is to  survive, 
and  survive it will  - adapt itself to changing conditions. 
In  the  Community,  the  CAP  has  to ·a  large extent been 
the  victim of its own  success.  The  technical  advances  and 
productivity gains  sought  in Article  39  of  the  Treaty have 
meant  that output has  risen more  rapidly  than  consumption. 
We  have  reduced our  dependence  on  imports  for  the  supply of 
some  agricultural products  and,  in other cases,  transformed 
the  Community  into  a  net exporter of others. 
Productivity increases  have  also  led to  an  imbalance 
of  supply  and  demand  - as  here  - with milk  as  the  most 
glaring example.  Increases  in  the  volume  of total agri-
cultural production  have  averaged  between  l  1/2  and  2% 
a  year whilst  consumption  has  only risen by  about  1/2%. 
However,  in spite of our  achieving security of  supply in 
a  number  of important  farm  products  - one  of  the  Treaty's 
. I ... 
6. aims  - the  EC  remains  by  far  the world's  largest importer 
of agricultural and  food  products whilst the  US  remains 
the world's  leading exporter. 
At  the  same  time.,  we  are  running very  low  on  cash  -
whether our  farm expenditure  represents  less  than  one  half 
of one  per cent of our  GDP  or not. 
From  1974  to 1979,  expenditure  on  supporting agricultural 
markets  grew  at 23%  per year  - almost  twice  the  rate of 
growth  in our  revenue.  For  the  next  tNO  or three  years  -
1980  to  1982  - expenditure  remained  fairly stable,  largely 
because  prices  remained  relatively high  on  world markets. 
But  since  thedexpenditure  has  increased sharply  tonce  again, 
as it has  here),  and  increased  about  30%  in 1983. 
As  I  said earlier - our  Community  Constitution  forbids 
us  to  run  a  budget deficit.  So,  for  the  first  time  we  are 
running  very  close  indeed to our  financial  limits. 
There  is very little spare left.  This  chilling fact 
coupled with  that of production  outpacing  consumption  is  the 
background  against which  the  Commission  proposed  and  the 
Council  of Ministers  - that is to  say National  ~inisters 
in  a  rare act of political courage  adopted  - an essential 
and  very  tough battery of measures  for  the  rationalisation 
of our agriculture. 
. I ... 
7. / 
Time  does  not allow me  to describe  in  any detail  the 
full  range of measures  which will hit  8  million European 
farmers  and  their families  and  which will  demand  substantial 
sacrifices  from  them.  Recent  demonstrations  by  European 
farmers  in England  and  France  for  example  leave little doubt 
that they will be  squeezed. 
But briefly the global  agreement reached can  be  sum-
marised  in six main  points  : 
- confirmation of the principle of guarantee  thresholds, 
and  their extension to other products  ; 
- strict control of milk  production  by  means  of quotas  ; 
- a  return to  the  unity of the  market,  through  the  dis-
mantling of monetary  compensatory  amounts  ; 
tough  policy  for prices  ; 
- streamlining of aids  and  premiums  for  various  products 
- observance  of Community  preference. 
Let  me  flesh out  some  of  those  six main  elements 
Guarantee  Thresholds.  These  thresholds  which  put  a  strict 
ceiling on  the  amount  of  a  given  crop  a  farmer  may  produce 
without him having to  contribute to the  cost of disposing 
of  the  surplus,  were  extended  to  three  new  products --
sunflower  seed,  durum  wheat  and  raisins.  They  were  conti-
nued  for milk,  cereals,  colza,  cotton,  tomatoes  and  sugar. 
Prices.  Price decisions  were  adapted  to  the  different 
market situations  for  the different products.  For  example, 
8. 
for  sugar  there will  be  a  price  freeze  and  for grains  a  1%  cut  • 
. I ... ----·  -----~·--·  -·-----------------
Overall,  farm prices  for  the  1984/85  marketing year 
will be  cut by  0.5  per cent as  expressed  in European  Cur-
rency Units.  And  for  the  first time  ever the  Council's 
decisions  mean  that  in national  currencies  there will 
be  significant price reductions  for  a  number  of products 
in several Member  States. 
In addition there will be  an  intensification of our 
efforts to  narrow  the  gap  between  our  prices  and  those  of 
our  competitors.  This  will apply particularly to grain. 
Milk  Production.  Because  the  milk  supply/demand  equation 
was  so  seriously out of balance,  forcing  the  Community  to 
purchase  large quantities,  strict production quotas  have 
been  set for  five  years  at only one  per  cent  above  1981 
milk  deliveries.  Harsh  levies will  be  applied  to  any  milk 
producer that exceeds his  assigned  limits.  The  levy  has 
been  set at  75%  of  the  milk  target price.  In  other words, 
totally dissuasive.  In  addition,  prices  have  been  frozen. 
This  brings  me  to  an  external aspect of the  package 
which,  whilst only  a  very  small  part of  the  whole,  has  at-
tracted  a  great deal  of attention here.  Since  our  own 
farmers  are  being asked  to  make  considerable  sacrifices 
and  to  limit their production,  the  Commission  feels  that 
it is not  unreasonable  to  review the  treatment of  competing 
imports  provided  that this is  done  strictly in accordance 
with international  trading rules. 





As  I  said earlier,  we  are  aiming  to narrow  the  gap 
between  our  grain prices  and  those of our competitors.  EC 
milk  producers  bore  the  brunt of the price decisions  this 
year because  the  demand/supply  imbalance  was  most  serious 
here  and  our grain producers  escaped relatively lightly 
this  time with only  a  1%  price cut compared with  the  awful 
fate which befell the  dairy sector.  They  have  been warned 
that they are next in  the  firing line. 
Such  a  move  will  have  the effect of making  grain substitutes 
much  less attractive.  But until that time  and whilst we 
are  implementing  a  strict guarantee  threshold  and  requiring 
our  grain pr0ducers  to limit their  own  production,  it is 
absolutely essential to  have  some  effective stabilisation 
of  the  imports  of grain  substitutes.  In other words, 
we  are  looking  for  a  temporary  breathing space  so  as  to 
avoid  the  risk of sabotage  to  our efforts  to  get our  grain 
prices  lower  and  to  limit production.  Such  stabilisation 
10. 
should also help  to  reduce  surpluses  in  the  livestock sector. 
Our  aim  of stabilising imports of substitutes is not 
a  fiendish  European plot aimed  specifically at the  residues 
of  the  US  corn processing industry which,  incidentally,  has 
been  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  high priced  and  US  res-
trictive arrangements  for  sugar.  Substitutes are  imported 
into  the  EC  from  a  wide  range  of sources  and  arrangements 
have  already  been  concluded  for  manioc  and  for  bran  coming 
from  Southeast Asia  and  elsewhere. 
. I ... However,  and  I  must  stress this,  what is being proposed 
is not hasty unilateral action,  not  a  banning of corn  gluten 
imports  nor  even  a  reduction  in  imports,  as  one  might  gather 
from  the  howls  of protest,  but  a  calm and  reasoned negotia-
tion aimed at a  temporary stabilisation of imports with ap-
propriate compensation  and  this only after fully carrying 
out the procedures  laid down  in  the  GATT.  The  first meeting 
on  this  subject  took  place  in  Geneva last week. 
Two  final  observations  about  this particular proposal. 
Our  cutting back  on  milk  production  should  reduce  demand  for 
corn  gluten  feed.  And,  furthermore,  it seems  to  me  that if 
11. 
we  can  successfully stabilise our  imports  of grain substitutes, 
then  the  amount  of European  wheat which  should  be  forced  onto 
world markets  because it had  been  displaced by  substitutes in 
animal  feeding,  would  be  reduced.  A  factor which  should not 
be without interest to  US  wheat  farmers. 
Those  briefly are  the  decisions  taken in Brussels 
at the  end of March  1984,  most  of which  are  now  in place. 
But  this was  not  an  instant rescue  package  and  more  hard 
decisions will have  to  be  taken. 
Nevertheless,  these  recent decisions  which  are not 
an  attempt  to shuffle off our  problems  on  to others but 
-
represent  an  important contribution  towards  a  better 
balance of  supply  and  demand  on  world markets,  something 
. I ... the  US  has  been  pressing  us  to do  for years,  should be  of 
benefit to all farmers  in all trading nations. 
They  were  not,I must emphasise,taken purely for 
budgetary reasons,  but to fit our  farming  to meet  the 
12. 
changed  economic  circumstances  of  the  mid  1980's  and  beyond. 
And  they will not lead to  dismantling of the  CAP  nor 
to  the disappearance  of European  farm  products  from  world 
markets.  We  are not going to  "fold our  tents  and silently 
steal  a'\vay".  You  can  instead expect to  see  a  leaner,  more 
streamlined European  agriculture. 
more 
It seems  to  me  therefore that there is all the;reason 
for  us  to  seek  cooperation rather  than conflict, particularly 
with  the  prospect of ever  increasing yields  around  the world. 
The  EC,  whilst vigilantly defending its own  interests,  will 
be  prepared  - as it has  been  in  the past  - to  search diligently 
with  the  US  and others  for  ways  of  cooperating  so  as  to 
promote  world  trade.  Since if we  don't seize  the  opportu-
nity to  cooperate  we  shall all be  losers.  Those  who  are 
not attracted to  the  far  from  easy path of cooperation 
should bear  in mind  some  factors  of paramount  importance. 
First,  the  us  and  EC  are  the  largest economic  units 
operating on  world agricultural  markets  accounting  together 
for  about  one  third of world  trade  and  nearly  30%  of world 
agricultural exports.  . I ... Second,  that the  EC  is the world's  leading importer of 
agricultural products  and  the  US  farmers'  best  customer 
taking  7.6  bio  $worth of  farm  produce  in  1983  and  fore-
cast to rise to  8.8.  bio  $  in 1984  - Japan  5.9  bio  $  -
South America  4.9  bio  $.  Japan  is the  US's  leading single 
individual country market but  the  EC  - due  to its CAP  - is 
a  single multi-national market.  On  this point,  a  great 
deal is made  of the  US  reputation as  a  reliable supplier  -
and  understandably  so  - but how  many  of  you  have  paused to 
consider  how  very reliable the  allegedly protectionist EC 
is as  the world's best customer  for  farm products  ?  Only 
about  15%  of our  imports  from industrial countries  are 
subject to  levies  and  virtually all farm  products  from 
13. 
the  developing countries enter free.  In  fact,  a  recent 
study  by  OECD  showed  that it is the  EC  which  imports  by  head 
of population  the  largest quantity of agricultural products 
from  LDCs. 
Third,  that  the  US  is the world's  leading agricultural 
exporter  supplying about  55%  of  the  coarse  grains,  50%  of 
the  soya of which  the  EC  takes  very  nearly half,  45%  of 
the  wheat,  30%  of  the  cotton  and  25%  of  the  rice  that move 
in world  trade. 
That  the  more  numerous  that agricultural exporters  become 
on  world markets  the  greater the  need  for  internal disci-
pline. 
. I ... : 
That  every agricultural exporting nation  assists its 
farm  trade directly or indirectly. 
14. 
That  no  one  has  a  God  given  right to dominate  world markets 
at will at the  expense of other partners  who  may  have  diffe-
rent methods  of subsidisation. 
But for  such cooperation  and  for  any other concerted 
measures,  we  shall need  considerable political will not 
only in Washington  and  Brussels  and  in capitals around  the 
world,  but in communities  such  as  Richmond  and  Rouen,in  the 
Appalachians  and  the  Alps,  to  achieve  rules  of  conduct  for 
agricultural trade  which will benefit us  all. 
If we  keep  cool  and  bear  in  mind  the  big picture of 
the  total trade  - not  just agriculture  - across  the Atlantic 
and  the  mutual  advantage  this  provides  and if we  can  continue 
along  the  same  general  course  which  we  both  seem  to  have  set 
out on  - that of controlling  farm  spending,  I  believe  we  can 
build a  more  secure  and  prosperous  West  on  the  foundations 
of the  one world  trading  system. 
DR/sbh 
21/6/84 
*  *  * 